AB-KV-Ch18
Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch18’’’ Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter18= 559. The Ideal Buddha 823 BOOK XVIII 1. Of the Buddha and thin World. Controverted Point . — That it is not right to say ‘ The Exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind. 1 From the Commentary.— Some, like the Vetuly alias, 1 carelessly in- terpreting the Sutta, ‘born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt, having overcome the world, undefiled by the world,’ hold that the Exalted One, when born in the heaven of Delight, 2 dwelt there while visiting this world only in a shape specially created. Their citation of the Sutta proves nothing, since the Master was undefiled, not by being out of the world, but by the corruptions of heart with respect to the things in the world. 1 Th . — But are there not shrines, parks, settlements, villages, towns, kingdoms, countries mentioned by the Buddha? 3 2 And was he not born at Lumbinl, super- enlightened under the Bodhi tree? Was not the Norm- wheel set rolling by him at Benares? Bid he not renounce the will to live at the Chapala shrine ? 4 Bid he not complete existence at Kusinara ? 3 Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Bkikkhus, I was once staying at Uhkatthd in the Subhaga 1 See above, XVII. 6. 2 Tusita-bhavana. This was traditionally the Buddha’s last celestial life (Pss. of the Sisters , 8). 3 Reading Buddha-vuttani with Br. and the PTS edition. The Siamese printed edition reads -vutthani, 1 dwelt in by the Buddha.’ Either compound is very uncommon in older Pali. * Dialogues , ii. 113. ‘Sankhara’ may be used for c e t a n a, the foremost of the sankhar a’s. 824 Buddh ist Docctism XVIII. 2. Wood by the King’s-Sdl Tree.’ 1 . . . ‘ I was once staying at Uruveld by the Goatherds’ Banyan before I was super- enlightened J 1 ... I was once staying at Rdjagaha in the Bamboo Wood at the Squirrels’ Feeding -ground. ... I was once staying at Saratthl in J eta’s Wood, Anathapuuliha’s Baric. ... I was once staying at Vesdll in the Great Wood, at the Gable House Hall 5 i Surely then the Exalted Buddha lived among men. 4 V . — But did not the Exalted One, 4 born in the world, enlightened in the world, live, having overcome the world, mi- defiled by the world ’ ? 3 Hence it is surely not right to say ‘The Exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind.’ 4 2. Of how the Norm was taught. Controverted Point . — That it is not right to say 4 The Exalted Buddha himself taught the Norm.’ From the Commentary. — This is another point in the foregoing heresy. The created shape taught the Norm on earth to the Venerable Ananda, while the Exalted One lived in the city of Delight and sent forth that shape. 1 Th . — By whom then was it taught ? V . — By the special creation. Th. — Then must this created thing have been the Conqueror, the Master, the Buddha Supreme, the Omni- 1 Majjh/ima-NiTc., i. 326. 2 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 185. The Buddha is in many Suttas related to have been staying at each of these places, and as telling ‘ blukkhus ’ that he had done so on this or that occasion. 3 Sayyutta-Nilc., iii. 140, where the first two words quoted— 1 ok e j at o — seem to have been omitted. 4 On this 4 Doeetic ’ heresy, which throve later among Ma ajanist Buddhists, Prof. Anesaki’s article, s.v. ‘ Docetism,’ Ency. Religion and Ethics, should be consulted. 5(>0. Buddhist Docetism 825 scient, All-seeing, Lord of all things, Judge of Appeal of all things !...?■ 2 I ask again : By whom was the Norm taught ? V . — By the venerable Ananda. Th . — Then must he too have been the Conqueror, the Master, etc. 3 But was it not said by the Exalted One : Sariputta, I may teach the Norm concisely and I may teach it in detail, and I may teach it both mays. If is only they who understand that are hard to find’ ?- Hence surely the Buddha himself taught the Norm. 4 And again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ By the higher knowledge, bhikkhiis, do I teach the Norm, not without the higher knowledge,- a Norm with reference to cause do I teach, not one without; a wonder-working Norm do I teach, and none not wonder-working . And that I, bhikkhiis, thus teach the Norm, a homily should be made, instruction should be given, to wit, let this, bhikkhus, suffice for your con- tent, let this suffice for your satisfaction and for your glad- ness: — the Exalted One is Buddha Supreme l the Norm is well revealed! the Order is well trained 1 Note token this declaration was uttered , ten thousand world-systems trembled’ l 1 2 3 Hence surely the Exalted Buddha himself taught the Norm. 3. Of the Buddha and Pity. Controverted Point . — That the Exalted Buddha felt no pity. Prom the Commentary .— The procedure of those who have not conquered their passions, on the occasion of misfortune, to the objects of their affection, inclines the beholder to say that compassion is only 1 Of these eight titles, the first three are frequent in the Nikayas ; the last four are found usually in later books; but Anguttara-Nik. , i. 199, has the last one : dhamma Bhagavarj-patisarana. 2 Anguttara-Nik., i. 133. 3 We have not succeeded in discovering this passage verbatim in the Nikayas. The burden of it does not constitute one of the Eight Causes of Earthquake enumerated in Dialogues, ii. 114 f. But cf. ibid. 112 ; i. 55. 326 ‘ Very Man of Very Man 1 XVIII. 4, 5. passion. Hence some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge that the passion- less Buddha felt no compassion. 1 Th. — But this implies that neither did he feel love or sympathetic joy or equanimity. You deny. 2 But could he have these and yet lack pity ? 1 3 Your proposition implies also that he was ruthless. Yet you agree that the Exalted One was pitiful, kindly to the world, compassionate towards the world, and went about to do it good. 2 4 Nay, did not the Exalted One win to the attainment of universal pity? 3 5 U . — But if there was no passion (r a g a) in the Exalted One, surely there was in him no compassion (k a r u n a) ? 4. Of the Buddha and Fragrant Things. Controverted Point. — That even the excreta of the Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things. From the Commentary . — Out of an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha, certain of the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas hold this view. 1 Th. — This would imply that the Exalted One fed on perfumes. But you admit only that he fed on rice gruel. Hence your proposition is untenable. 2 Moreover, if your proposition were true, some would have used them for the toilet, gathering, saving them in basket and box, exposing them in the bazaar, making cos- metics with them. But nothing of the sort was done. . .. . 5. Of a One and Only Path. Controverted Point. — That the fourfold fruition of the religious life is realized by one path only. 1 Referring to the Four Sublime Moods or Infinitudes, exercises in the development of these emotions. See above, p. 76, n. 2. It is note- worthy that the opponent does not reserve the last of them, ‘ equanimity,’ as alone predicable, from Ms point of view, of the Buddha. 2 Except the third, these phrases are hard to trace in the Nikayas, albeit the ascription in other terms is frequent enough. 3 See Pahsariibhida-Magga, i. 126 f., 1 The Tathagata’s Insight by Great Pity.’ 563. Orderly Procedure of Spiritual Progress 327 From the Commentary . — The same sectaries, on the same grounds, hold that the Exalted One, in becoming Stream- Winner, Onee-Returner, Never-Beturner, Arahant, realized all these four Fruits by one single Ariyan Path not in the four distinct stages each called a path, 1 Th. — This implies a fusion of the four distinct con- scious procedures in each stage of progress, ■which you deny. Moreover, if there he one path only, which of the four is it ? -4. U. — The path of Arahantship. Th. — But do we teach that by that path the three first of the ten Fetters are removed — to wit, theory of soul, doubt, and infection of mere rule and ritual ? Bid not the Exalted One say that these are removed by the Stream-Winning Path? 2 And are gross passions and malevolence removed by the path of Arahantship ? Did not the Exalted One say that the fruit of the Once-Returner was the state of having reduced these to a minimum ? 3 And is it by the path of Arahantship that that minimum is removed ? You know it is not. If you assent, I can refer you to the words of the Exalted One, who said that the fruit of the Never-Returner was the state of having removed that minimum without remainder. 4 A . U . — But if we are wrong, and the Exalted One developed each Path in succession, can he be called Stream- Winner and so on? I’ou deny, but you have implied it. 1 Th. — But if the Exalted One realized these four fruits of the religious life by one Ariyan Path only, and the disciples by four Paths, they have seen what he did not see, they arrive, at where he did not arrive, they realize that which he did not realize. You cannot admit this . . . 6. Of the Transition from One Jhdiia to Another. Controverted Point . — That we pass from one -Jhana to another [immediately. 1 On the theory, combated above, IV. 4, 9, that past acquisitions remain permanent possessions instead of being wrought up into higher- powers. See also p. 66, and Sayyutta-Nih , v. 356 f. 328 Each -Than a a Separate Ecstasy XVIII. 6. From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahigs&sakas and certain of the Andhakas, hold that the formula of the Four Jhanas the Suttas warrants us in concluding that progress from one Jh ana-stage to another is immediate without any accessory procedure. 1 Th. — Does this imply that one can pass over from First to Third, from Second to Fourth Jhana ? You deny an arbitrary limit. . . . 2 Or take only a passing over from First Jhana attain- ment to that of Second — which you affirm to be possible — you are implying that the mental process — adverting, re- flecting, co-ordinating, attending, willing, wishing, aiming 1 — called up for First Jhana is the same as that required for Second Jhana. But you dissent. Do you mean that no preliminary mental process of adverting, etc., is required for Second Jhana ? On the contrary, you agree that Second Jhana arises after a certain mental process — adverting, etc. Therefore one does not pass over directly from First Jhana to the next. 3 take the objects and characteristics of First Jhana. The First Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the harmfulness of sense-desires ; 2 moreover, it is accompanied by application and sustenta- tion of thought. But neither that object nor these charac- teristics, you must admit, belong to the Second Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you to asserting identity between First and Second Jhana. 4 The same argument 2 applies to transition from Second to Third Jhana. 5 take the specific objects and characteristics of the Second Stage : the Second Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the harmfulness of application and sustentation of thought ; moreover, it is accompanied by zest. But neither that object nor these characteristics, you must admit, belong to the Third Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you 1 Cf. VII. 5, § 2. 2 Kama ; the object being to supersede earthly consciousness (that of the Kama-lo k a) by a heavenly 'or angelic consciousness (that of the E up a - lok a). 569. Fire fohl Series 329 to an assertion of identity between Second and Third -Thana. 6 The same argument 4 applies to transition from Third to Fourth -Thana. 7 take the specific objects and characteristics of the Third Stage-. the Third Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the harmfulness of zest ; moreover, it is accompanied by happiness. But neither that object nor these character- istics, you must admit, belong to the Fourth Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you to an assertion of identity between Third and Fourth -Thana. 8 M. A . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Here, bkikkhus, ivhen a bhikklm, aloof from sense-desires, etc. . attains to and abides in, First . . . Fourth - Thana ’ ? 1 According to that formula one does pass over immediately from Jhana to -Thana. 7. Of Jhclna and its Intervals. Controverted Point . — That there is an intermediate stage between the First and Second Stages. 2 From the Commentary . — The Sammitiyas and certain other of the Andhakas hold the view that, in the Fivefold Jhana series, 3 the Exalted One did not intend to classify, but only to indicate, three forms 4 of concentration. But not knowing that form of concentration to be possible which is accompanied by sustained thought (savieara), and counting only initial application (vitakka), they hold that the former intervenes between First and Second Jhana, thus making up a later fivefold series. 1 E.g., Dialogues, i. 84 f. ; passim in Nikavas. 2 The words ‘First,’ etc., to ‘ Fourth/ in this discourse must be understood solely with reference to the fourfold classification. 3 I.e., when First Jhana is divided into two, according as it is accompanied or unaccompanied by initial application of thought. See Bud. Psy. Eth., cf. p. 43 with p. 52. The Four Nikayas recognize only four stages. 4 Namely, as specified above, IX. 8, §§ 3, 4. The first and second divide First Jhana into two aspects, the third refers to the other three Jhanas. 830 Fourfold Classification of Jhana XVIII. 7. 1 Th . — But this is to imply intervening stages between contact or feeling, or perception. . . . Again, why deny intermediate stages between Second and Third, or Third and Fourth Jhana ? If you deny them here, you must deny them between First and Second Jhana. 8 You cannot maintain the intermediate stages between First and Second Jhana only, 4 denying the existence of such stages between the others. 5 You say that concentration of mind accompanied by sustained thought only, without its initial application, con- stitutes the intermediate stage. But why make an excep- tion in this way ? Or why not include the other two forms, accompanied by both or by neither ? 6 If you deny that concentration with or without initial and sustained applica- tion of thought is a Jhanie interval, why not deny it in the case of concentration without initial application, but with sustentation of thought ? 7 You maintain that in the interval between the mani- festation of two stages of Jhana there is concentration in sustained thought only, without initial application of thought. But while such concentration is proceeding, is not the first Jhana at an end and the second Jhana mani- fested ? You assent, but you contradict thus your proposi- tion. 8 S. A. — If we are wrong, does concentration in sus- tained thought only, without initial application of thought, constitute any one of the Four Jhanas ? You say, no. Then it must constitute an interim state — which is what we affirm. 9 Th. — But did not the Exalted One declare three forms of concentration, namely, in both applied and sus- tained thought, in the latter only, and where there is neither? 1 If so, you cannot single out the second form of concentration as a state intermediate between Jhanas. 1 Sayyiitta-Nik., iv. 363, etc. See above, IX. 8, § 4. For those unacquainted with the classic procedure in Jhana, it may be explained that whereas, in the first stage of attained ecstasy, consciousness includes (a) initial and sustained application of thought, (&) zest, 572. Rapt from Sense 381 8. Of Hearing in Jhana. Controverted Point. — That one who has attained Jhana hears sound. From the Commentary . — The opinion is held by some — the Pubba- seliyans, for instance — that because the Exalted One called sound a thorn to First Jhana, and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn in the flesh of one who had attained that state, it was inferable that such an one was able to hear. 1 Th „ — If so, it must be equally allowed that he can also see, smell, taste and touch objects. 1 This you deny . . . You must also allow that he enters Jhana enjoying auditory consciousness. You deny, for you agree that con- centration arises in one who is enjoying mental objects as such ? 2 But if you admit that anyone who is actually ^enjoying sounds hears sounds, and that concentration is the property of one who is actually enjoying mental objects as such, you should not affirm that one in the concentration of Jhana hears sounds. If you insist that he does, you have here two parallel mental procedures going on at the same time. . . . 3 P . — But was it not said by the Exalted One that sound is a thorn for First Jhana ? 2 Hence one in Jhana can surely hear sound. Tk . — You say that one in Jhana can hear sound, and quote the Word as to it being for First Jhana a f thorn.’ Now it was further said that thought applied and sustained is a thorn for Second Jhana — does one in Second Jhana have applied and sustained thought ? . . . Again, it was further said that the mental factor last eliminated is a thorn © pleasure, in the second stage (a) is eliminated, in the third (b), and in the fourth (o) are eliminated. Now, in ‘ fivefold Jhana,’ (a) was resolved into two stages. ( TheragdtM , 916, gives a different pafi- c&ngiko samadhi.) 1 ‘But there is no five-door procedure (of sense) in Jhana.’ — Corny. 2 Anguttara - Nik., v. 183-135. ‘ This was said because sound induces distraction. When a loud noise strikes the ear, one is aroused from First Jhana.’ — Corny. See above, p. 123. 332 Dot’s the Et/r see ? XVIII. 9. for the stage newly attained — zest for Third, respiration for Fourth -Than a. 1 perception of visible objects for con- sciousness of space-infinity, this perception for that' of con- sciousness as infinite, this perception for that of nothingness, perception and feeling for cessation of these in trance. Now is £ the thorn ’ actually present on the winning of the stage whence it is pronounced to be a thorn ? If not, then how- can you say that the e thorn ’ of hearing sound is present to one in First Jhana ? 9. Of the Eye and Seehuj. Controverted Point. — That we see visible objects with the eye. From the Commentary . — Here, judging by the Word — ‘ When he sees an object with the eye ’ — some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that the sentient surface in the eye is that which ‘ sees.’ In the quoted passage the method of naming a necessary instrument is followed, 2 as when we say 1 wounded by a bow,’ when the wound was inflicted by an arrow. So the words ‘ sees with the eye ’ are spoken of a seeing by visual consciousness. 1 Th . — Then you hold that we see matter by matter. . . . You deny. But think ! And if you now assent, 3 you imply that matter is able to distinguish matter. You deny. But think ! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is mind. . . . 4 2 Again, you are implying that the eye can ‘ advert ’ or reflect, co-ordinate, will, etc., 5 albeit you agree that the contrary is true. 1 So the Sntta. We should have expected sukha (pleasure or happiness). See Jhana formula. 3 Sambhara-katha. Cf. Attliasdlim, 399 f. in Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 851, n. 2. 3 ‘First he rejects, because of the separate category, “object of vision then assents, with respect only to the eye.’ — Corny. 4 Eupai] manovinfianap. 5 As in VII. 5, § 2. If the ‘eye’ sees, it should be immediately preceded by ‘ adverting ’ in the same way as the sense of sight (e a k k h u - v i h n a n a).— Corny. 333 378. ’ Does the Eye nee? 4 .These arguments hold good for similar claims put forward by you for the other four senses. 5 M . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : * Here , hhikkhus, a bhikkliu seen objects icith the eye, hears sounds, and so on ’ / 1 Hence surely tve see visible objects with the eye and' so on. 1 Dhammasangani, § 597, gives the passage verbatim as to the process — cakkhuna . . . rfipaij . . . passati; but though allu- sions to the visual process abound in the Nikayas, we have not traced the exact passage as in an exhortation to hhikkhus, except in the ‘ Guarded Doors ’ formula, e.g., Sayy-utta-NiJc, iv. 104, where the formula has d i s v a, 1 having seen,’ for p a s s a t i, ‘ sees.’